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Current Legal Developments: The Arctic 
Abstract 
The planting of a flag in a titanium canister on the seabed at the North Pole in August 2007 on the part of 
the Russian Federation and efforts by the other Arctic Ocean littoral states to reinforce their territorial and, 
particularly, maritime jurisdictional claims in the region, led to the Arctic becoming the focus of 
considerable global media attention in recent months. Much of this coverage has been alarmist in tone, 
replete with tales of a “scramble” or “race” for the Arctic, talk of an Arctic “land-grab”, and unease over a 
resultant Arctic resource “gold rush”. Although some of the media and even diplomatic responses have 
been, to say the least, somewhat misleading, these events have been set against the backdrop of some 
startling and potentially profound changes to the Arctic environment which have also served to heighten 
concerns over events in the region. The aim of this paper is to highlight key developments and explore 
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An Arctic Scramble? Opportunities and Th reats in the (Formerly) 
Frozen North
 Th e planting of a flag in a titanium canister on the seabed at the North Pole 
in August 2007 on the part of the Russian Federation and efforts by the other 
Arctic Ocean littoral states to reinforce their territorial and, particularly, mari-
time jurisdictional claims in the region, led to the Arctic becoming the focus of 
considerable global media attention in recent months. Much of this coverage 
has been alarmist in tone, replete with tales of a “scramble”1 or “race”2 for the 
Arctic, talk of an Arctic “land-grab”,3 and unease over a resultant Arctic 
resource “gold rush”.4 Although some of the media and even diplomatic 
responses have been, to say the least, somewhat misleading, these events have 
been set against the backdrop of some startling and potentially profound 
changes to the Arctic environment which have also served to heighten concerns 
over events in the region. Th e aim of this paper is to highlight key develop-
ments and explore some of the legal and policy issues that arise. 
 Th e Changing Arctic—Unfreezing Seas 
 Th e Arctic Ocean is a semi-enclosed sea5 surrounded by five coastal states: 
Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Norway (Svalbard), Russia and the United 
States of America (USA). A further three states, Finland, Iceland and Sweden, 
1  For example, see B. Leapman, “Denmark joins race to claim North Pole”, Sunday Telegraph, 
14 August 2007. 
2  M. Richardson, “Race is on for Arctic resources”, Th e Canberra Times, 10 September 2007. 
3  D. R. Sands, “Sea treaty sparks rivalries”, Washington Times, 12 November 2007. 
4  P. Reynolds, “Russia ahead in Arctic ‘gold rush’ ”, BBC News, 1 August 2007, <http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6925853.stm>; and P. Reynolds, “Th e Arctic’s new gold rush”, BBC News, 
25 October 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4354036.stm>. 
5  Th e question of whether the Arctic Ocean qualifies as a semi-enclosed sea within the 
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are also generally considered to be Arctic states.6 Th e Arctic’s most pronounced 
feature, at least until very recently, has been a large, mostly ice-covered ocean 
throughout the year. However, profound changes appear to be taking place in 
the Arctic land- and, especially, seascape. Th e 2004 Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment catalogued the range of impacts that are occurring in a warming 
Arctic from human-influenced climatic change. Th e report concluded that 
the temperature has risen at twice the rate as in the rest of the world in the past 
few decades and there is increasing evidence of widespread melting of glaciers, 
permafrost and sea ice.7 Th ese impacts are expected to intensify and over the 
next 100 years temperatures would rise by 3–5°C over the land and by up to 
7°C over the oceans,8 driving significant changes through the ecological and 
socio-economic structure of the Arctic.9 
 On 14 September 2007, the European Space Agency reported that the area 
covered by sea ice in the Arctic had shrunk to its lowest level since the initia-
tion of satellite measurements 30 years ago.10 Th e United States National Snow 
and Ice Data Centre reported that the average five-day mean sea ice extent in 
September 2007 was 4.13 million km2. Th is was compared to the 1979–2000 
average of 6.74 million km2—a massive reduction to the average extent of 
2.61 million km2.11 Th e record 2007 sea ice reduction followed the 2005 
record minimum of 5.32 million km2, an additional loss of over 1 million km2 
from 2005. Th is sudden and dramatic loss can be viewed in the context of 
reductions in sea ice cover over the last 10 years of approximately 100,000 km2 
meaning of Article 122 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) 
has been described as something of a “vexed question” in itself, not least because of the obliga-
tion for bordering states to cooperate under Article 123 of the same Treaty. See R. Rayfuse, 
“Melting Moments: Th e future of polar oceans governance in a warming world”, Review of 
European Community and International Environmental Law (RECIEL) (2007) 16 (2): 196–216, 
at 210. 
6  Although the most common definition of the Arctic region as a whole is the area lying north 
of the Arctic Circle at 66°33' north, a variety of definitions for the Arctic region as a whole 
exist, dependent on the issue or context under discussion. A useful summary of definitional 
options is provided by Rayfuse, ibid., at 197. 
7  Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, “Impacts of A Warming Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment” (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004) 146 pp, available at <http://www.
acia.uaf.edu>. 
 8  Ibid., at 10. 
 9  See, for example, D. Barber, L. Fortier and M. Byers, “Th e incredible shrinking sea ice”, 
Options Politiques (December 2005–January 2006): 66–71. 
10  European Space Agency (ESA), “Satellites witness lowest Arctic sea ice coverage in history” 
(2007) ESA News, available at <http://www.esa.int/esaCP/SEMYTC13J6F_index_0.html>. 
11  See National Snow and Ice Data Centre (NSIDC), Arctic Sea Ice News, Fall 2007, available 
at <http://nsidc.org/news/press/2007_seaiceminimum/20070810_index.html>. 
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per year on average. Forecast models of summer sea ice extent show a continu-
ing downward trend of cover,12 but debate continues over the period when the 
Arctic will be ice free (in summer). Scientists have commented that despite 
the uncertainty in forecasting models through the 21st century, the rapid 
loss of sea ice could result in a sea ice-free summer by 2030,13 or perhaps 
even sooner.14 
 Despite this apparently compelling evidence of the impact of human-
induced climate change on the Arctic, it has been argued that this is not neces-
sarily the case and that some of the changes being witnessed in high northern 
latitudes are in fact part of long-term cyclical processes.15  
 A Scramble for what? 
 Increasing access to Arctic waters and recent moves to support extended 
continental shelf claims in the central Arctic Ocean are often viewed in 
resource access terms. In particular, the Arctic has been portrayed as a major 
potential source, or ‘last frontier’, of (sub)seabed energy resources. Conse-
quently, the Arctic has most commonly been seen through the lens of escalat-
ing energy prices and related global energy security concerns. Indeed, at the 
time of writing, the price of oil was flirting with US$100 per barrel16—a level 
12  M. Serreze, M. Holland and J. Stroeve1, “Perspectives on the Arctic shrinking sea-ice cover” 
(2007) 315 Science 1533–1536. 
13  See comments in: D. Adam, “Ice-free Arctic could be here in 23 years”, Th e Guardian, 
Wednesday, 5 September 2007, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/
sep/05/climatechange.sciencenews>. 
14  For example, Louis Fortier, Scientific Director of the Canadian research network ArcticNet, 
suggested that sea ice was melting faster than predicted and that consequently the Arctic 
Ocean could be free of ice in the summer as soon as 2010 or 2015, “and it’s probably going to 
happen even faster than that.” See M. White, “‘Frightening’ projection: ice-free passage pos-
sible by 2010”, National Post (Canada), 15 November 2007. Even more alarmingly it was 
subsequently suggested in December 2007 that the Arctic could be ice-free in summer by 
2013. Professor Wieslaw Maslowski of the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 
whose team includes members from NASA and the Institute of Oceanology, Polish Academy 
of Sciences (PAS), remarked that the 2013 projection does not take into account the Arctic ice 
minima of 2005 and 2007 and that as such even this estimate may be “too conservative”. See 
J. Amos, “Arctic summers ice-free ‘by 2013’”, BBC News, 12 December 2007, <http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7139797.stm>. 
15  See “NASA sees Arctic Ocean circulation do an about-face”, available at <www.physorg.
com/news114189626.html>. 
16  See BBC News “Oil price at record $100 a barrel”, 2 January 2008; <http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/business/7168664.stm>. 
154 T. Potts, C. Schofield / Th e International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 23 (2008) 151–176
virtually unthinkable even a few months ago. Such prices and advances in 
recovery technologies, especially in deep water, help to explain interest in the 
Arctic as well as other underexplored offshore hydrocarbon provinces. 
 Th e statistical authority often cited to support this view is the United States 
Geological Survey’s (USGS) 2000 estimate that the Arctic may hold as much 
as 25% of the world’s undiscovered resources.17 Russian estimates similarly 
indicate that the Arctic’s potential energy reserves are significant.18 
 Breathless expectations of an Arctic hydrocarbon ‘Eldorado’ should, how-
ever, be treated with considerable caution. Such predictions should be tem-
pered by the fact that little serious exploration has taken place in Arctic waters 
due to the presence of sea ice coupled with severe environmental conditions. 
Consequently, exploration efforts have been largely restricted to a narrow 
peripheral zone of the Arctic Ocean where ice cover has traditionally been 
absent, or at least thinner, on a seasonal basis. It is also understood that most, 
if not all, of the oil- and gas-bearing sedimentary basins of the Arctic fall 
within 200 nautical miles (nm)19 of the coast and thus within the EEZs of the 
Arctic littoral states, meaning that claims to the outer continental shelf are 
unlikely to yield an oil and gas bonanza.20 
 Th is view has been underlined by a recent report employing detailed geo-
scientific analysis of individual Arctic basins, backed by oil industry data on 
17  See, for example, Th e Economist, “Drawing lines in melting ice”, 18 August 2007. It is 
notable that the USGS findings relate to undiscovered oil and that a summary of the report 
does not, in fact, even make mention of the Arctic specifically. See <http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs-
062–03/FS-062–03.pdf>. 
18  Russian estimates of potential seabed resources in the Arctic have been reportedly in the 
range of 9–10 billion tonnes of fuel equivalent, although official Russian government esti-
mates are put at up to 5 billion tonnes. See G. Faulconbridge, “Russia to file Arctic claim to 
(sic) U.N. this year: radio”, Ottawa Citizen, 30 October 2007. See also P. Baev, “Russia’s Race 
for the Arctic and the New Geopolitics of the North Pole” (October 2007), Occasional Paper, Th e 
Jamestown Foundation, 17 pp, at 6–7. Available from: <http://jamestown.org/docs/James-
town-BaevRussiaArctic.pdf>. 
19  Some commentators maintain that the correct abbreviation for a nautical mile is “M” and 
that “nm” should only be used for nanometres. However, “nm” is widely used by many author-
ities (for example the UN Office of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea) and appears to cause 
less confusion than “M”, which is often assumed to be an abbreviation for metres. 
20  R. Macnab, P. Neto and R. van de Poll, “Cooperative preparations for determining the 
outer limit of the juridical continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean: A model for regional col-
laboration in other parts of the world?”, Proceedings of a Continental Shelf Workshop hosted 
by the Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI), Buenos Aires, 13–15 November 
2000. Reprinted with permission in Boundary and Security Bulletin (2001) 9(1) (Spring): 
86–96, at 88. 
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exploration wells and existing discoveries, the findings of which were consid-
erably less optimistic than the estimates outlined above.21 Not only were 
estimates for Arctic resource potential substantially lower,22 but it was also 
concluded that the Arctic is predominantly a gas province.23 Th is has significant 
implications, as gas is much harder to transport to markets and required tech-
nologies are still in their infancy, meaning that exploitation of a large portion 
of Arctic gas resources is likely to be delayed until 2050.24 Overall it was stated 
that these findings were “disappointing from a world oil resource base per-
spective” and “calls into question the long-considered view that the Arctic 
represents one of the last great oil and gas frontiers and a strategic energy sup-
ply cache for the US.”25 
 Th is is not, however, to wholly discount the idea of major oil and gas finds 
being made in the Arctic—these may just not necessarily be on the same scale 
as some optimistic reports may suggest. Furthermore, the strong perception 
that appears to exist that such seabed riches may exist is in itself a powerful 
factor in motivating claims to maritime jurisdiction. 
 It has also been suggested that the seabed of the Arctic Ocean may harbour 
substantial reserves of gas hydrates, which may be exploited in the future.26 
While the potential may well be very large, the technologies required to exploit 
these resources, especially from such remote areas and in such hostile condi-
tions, mean that their exploitation currently remains over the horizon. 
 With regard to the marine living resources of the Arctic Ocean, their extent 
and sustainability are similarly not well known. It is, however, thought 
that Arctic species, which are generally slow-growing due to their cold 
environment, are likely to be especially vulnerable to overfishing.27 In light 
of the depletion of stocks elsewhere, especially in waters beyond the national 
jurisdiction of coastal states—the so-called ‘tragedy of the commons’—new 
21  Th e joint Wood MacKenzie and Fugro Robertson study, Future of the Arctic, was released 
on 1 November 2007. See “Arctic role diminished in world oil supply”, Wood Mackenzie Press 
Release, available at <http://www.woodmacresearch.com/cgi-bin/corp/portal/corp/corpPress-
Detail.jsp?oid=751298>. 
22  3 million barrels of oil equivalent per day (mboepd) liquids and 5 mboepd gas at peak. 
Ibid. 
23  It was reported that 85 per cent of discovered resource and 74 per cent of exploration 
potential was as gas.Ibid. 
24  Ibid. 
25  Andrew Latham, Vice President, Energy Consulting, Wood MacKenzie. See “Arctic role 
diminished in world oil supply”, ibid. 
26  Macnab et al., supra note 20, at 88. 
27  Barber et al., supra note 9, at 68. 
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fishing opportunities in an ice-free Arctic will require strict management 
if they are not to be short-lived.28 Th e Arctic may also prove to be a source 
of useful genetic material in view of the region’s unique environmental 
conditions, raising biodiversity preservation issues and the management of 
bioprospecting.29 
 Th e significant reduction in sea ice in recent times has raised the prospects 
for the opening up of long-sought navigational routes, the Northwest Passage—
aptly termed the “Arctic Grail”30 —and the Northern Sea Route (formerly 
known as the Northeast Passage),31 and even a transpolar route.32 Satellite 
imagery from September 2007 showed the Northwest Passage to be com-
pletely ice free and the alternative route, the Northern Sea Route, to be par-
tially blocked. However, in the 2005 sea ice minimum, the Northern Sea 
Route was partially open.33 Th e prospect of seasonal and permanently open 
shipping routes in the Arctic could significantly cut the distances that need to 
be traversed, for instance between Europe and the east coast of North America 
and Asia. Indeed, it has been suggested that, if navigable, the Northwest Pas-
sage would offer a 7,000 km saving on the route between Asia and the East 
Coast of the USA over the route via the Panama Canal, whilst the Northern 
Sea Route would entail a 40 percent distance savings on the transit between 
northern Europe and northeast Asia as compared with a route via the Suez or 
Panama Canals.34 With regard to the trans-polar route, the figures are even 
28  See, for example, Rayfuse, supra note 5, at 212–213. 
29  Macnab et al., supra note 20, at 88; Rayfuse, supra note 5, at 213. 
30  See P. Berton, Th e Arctic Grail: Th e Quest for the Northwest Passage and the North Pole, 
1818–1909 (McClelland and Stewart, Toronto, 1988). See also M. Byers and S. Lalonde, 
“Who controls the Northwest Passage?” Discussion paper prepared in advance of a conference 
on “Canada’s Arctic Waters in International Law and Diplomacy”, National Arts Centre, Ottawa, 
14 June 2006, available at <www.ligi.ubc.ca/sites/liu/files/Publications/7Jun2006ArcticWaters
DiscussionPaper.do>. 
31  See, for example, W. V. Dunlap, Transit Passage in Russian Arctic Straits, Maritime Briefing 
1 (7) (International Boundaries Research Unit, Durham, 1996), 84 pp. 
32  Iceland has reportedly been keen to promote such a route across the central Arctic Ocean 
between the Fram and Bering Straits, whereby cargo-carrying icebreakers could shuttle back 
and forth between transshipment points in Alaska and Iceland, where cargos would be 
exchanged with conventional vessels (R. Macnab, personal communication, November 2007). 
See also Breaking the Ice Arctic Development and Maritime Transportation: Prospects of the Tran-
sarctic Route—Impact and Opportunities, Summary of Presentations delivered during a Confer-
ence organised by the Icelandic Government, Akureyki, Iceland, March 27–28, 2007, 31 pp; 
available at <http://arcticportal.org/uploads/4L/PJ/4LPJRQYK8NK3h1pOCAST5Q/Breaking-
Th eIce_ensk-tgfa.pdf >. 
33  See NSIDC, supra note 11. 
34  See Byers and Lalonde, supra note 30, at 3–5. Richardson, supra note 2, cites the following 
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more dramatic, with a voyage between Hamburg, Germany and Kobe, Japan 
being 11,225 nm via the traditional route through the Suez Canal compared 
with around 5,000 nm over the North Pole.35 Although the significantly 
reduced distances involved represent an enticing prospect for the international 
shipping sector, distance alone does not tell the whole story. Such savings may 
be at least partially illusory, as reduced distances will not necessarily translate 
into equivalent savings in terms of transit times and navigational costs. Th is is 
because, although sea ice may well have thinned and cleared enough to enable 
transit of these routes, ice will remain a prominent feature of the high north-
ern latitudes, presenting a significant potential hazard to navigation and thus 
necessitating cautious and slow navigation.36 
 Th e prospect of the Northwest Passage opening up to shipping has, how-
ever, led to the re-emergence of the dispute between Canada and the US over 
the legal status of the waterway—an issue that was a largely redundant one 
whilst the Passage was effectively impassable.37 Th ere is also legal uncertainty 
over the status of formerly ice-covered waters in the Arctic and the application 
of Article 234 of the LOSC that deals with the application of pollution pre-
vention laws applicable to vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the 
EEZ.38 As previously noted, however, discussion of the Northwest Passage and 
other Arctic Sea routes opening up to commercial traffic is, however, arguably 
example: “‘A container cargo ship travelling at 21 knots between Japan’s Yokohama port and 
Rotterdam in the Netherlands takes 29 days if it goes around the Cape of Good Hope at the 
southern tip of Africa. It takes 22 days via the Strait of Malacca and Singapore and on to 
Europe through the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean Sea. But the same ship would take just 
15 days via the Arctic Ocean.” 
35  P. R. M. Toomey, “Global Warming: Arctic Shipping”, Canadian Polar Commission, 
Meridian (Fall/Winter 2007), 6–11, at 8; available at <http://www.polarcom.gc.ca/media.
php?mid=3278>. 
36  For an analysis of the pitfalls involved provided by an experienced former icebreaker captain 
with the Canadian Coast Guard, see ibid. Toomey (ibid., at 8–9), asserts that the great savings 
associated with the direct route across the Pole will be realized much later than coastal routes 
as “only very ice capable ships will be able to use it for many years to come, and ice will always 
cause either damage or delays.” He also suggests that Russia is best placed among the Arctic 
coastal states to take advantage of these emerging Arctic navigational opportunities. 
37  For recent Canadian and US perspectives on this issue see Byers and Lalonde, supra note 
30; J. Kraska, “Th e Law of the Sea Convention and the Northwest Passage”, International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (2007) 22 (2): 257–282. 
38  For a detailed analysis of the legal issues surrounding the Northwest Passage see: D. Pharand 
“Th e Arctic Waters and the Northwest Passage: A final revisit” (2007) Ocean Development and 
International Law 38: 3–69. 
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somewhat premature. It is by no means inevitable that these routes will 
become swiftly and reliably open and navigable.39 
 Polar Flag Waving 
 Finally, the geopolitical aspects of extended continental shelf claims should 
not be discounted. Even though senior Russian officials have emphasised that 
Russia is acting in accordance with international law (see below), there is no 
doubt that the symbolic planting of the Russian flag at the North Pole served 
to invest a legitimate process with geopolitical weight and significance. In 
particular, Russia’s action was greeted with great fanfare in the domestic polit-
ical context40 and illustrates a more robust posture internationally. 
 Arctic Maritime Claims 
 Despite media portrayals of recent events in the Arctic as constituting some 
kind of land grab, the past and present conduct of the Arctic Ocean littoral 
states has been predominantly in accordance with international law and par-
ticularly the LOSC.41 All the Arctic Ocean coastal states, with the notable 
exception of the USA, are LOSC parties.42 At the time of writing, ratification 
of the LOSC was once again on the agenda in the US. Arguably recent events 
in the Arctic may be a positive influence in this regard; however, the question 
39  Byers and Lalonde, supra note 30, at 4, and Toomey, supra note 35. 
40  Russian President Putin reportedly stated that the planting of the Russian flag at the North 
Pole was “fully in line with Russia’s strategic interests.” With regard to press reaction, Rossiis-
kaya Gazeta’s declaration that Russia’s action and the division of the Arctic heralded “the 
start of a new distribution of the world” was perhaps the most dramatic claim. See, for exam-
ple, M. Moore, “Russia Arctic stunt celebrated by Moscow press”, Th e Daily Telegraph 
(London), 4 August 2007. 
41  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, Jamaica, 10 December 
1982 (in force as from 16 November 1994), Publication No. E97.V10 (New York, United 
Nations, 1983). See, for example, I. Townsend-Gault, “Not a carve-up: Canada, sovereignty 
and the Arctic Ocean”, International Zeitschrift (2007)1(3) (August), available at <www.
zeitschrift.co.uk/>. 
42  See United Nations, Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, of the 
Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the Convention and of the Agreement for 
the implementation of the Convention relating to the conservation and management of straddling 
fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks (United Nations, New York, updated to 26 October 
2007), available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/status2007.pdf >. 
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of US ratification of the LOSC remains controversial.43 All of these states, 
without exception, have also advanced claims to zones of maritime jurisdic-
tion in accordance with those provided for under the LOSC.44 It is worth 
emphasising, in the context of these misleading reports, that the EEZ claims 
that encircle the Arctic Ocean, and the extended continental shelf rights in 
the central Arctic Ocean beyond 200 nm from the coast, are necessarily claims 
to specific sovereign rights as laid down in the LOSC and not to sovereignty 
over these areas, as implied by the current media discourse concerning alleged 
“land grabs” and the like. 
 While the USA is not a party to the LOSC, it pursues a policy consistent 
with the LOSC. Indeed, as the world’s pre-eminent maritime power, the USA 
has taken a conservative or restrictive view in respect of maritime claims and 
has routinely protested against what it views as excessive maritime claims.45 
Th is is illustrated, for example, by the fact that the USA, alone among the 
Arctic Ocean littoral states, has not claimed straight baselines along its coasts 
and has taken exception to the baselines claimed by some of the other Arctic 
claimant states. It should be acknowledged that the application of baselines in 
the context of ice-covered coasts is problematic and this issue has generated 
debate.46 
 With regard to maritime boundary delimitation, while the majority of 
potential maritime boundaries have yet to be delimited, this is hardly remark-
able in a global context.47 While maritime disputes do exist in the region, 
43  See E. Schor, “Republican rightwingers find an Iraq-on-sea”, Th e Guardian, 25 October 2007; 
Sands, supra note 3. 
44  For a summary of these claims see R. R. Churchill, “Claims to maritime zones in the Arc-
tic—law of the sea normality or polar peculiarity?”, A. G. Oude Elferink and D. R. Rothwell 
(eds.) Th e Law of the Sea and Polar Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction (Martinus Nijhoff, 
Th e Hague, 2001), at 105–124. 
45  Th is is accomplished through the US’s Freedom of Navigation Program. See J. A. Roach 
and R. W. Smith, United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims (Martinus Nijhoff Pub-
lishers, Th e Hague, 1996). 
46  For discussion of this issue in the Arctic context see, for example, J. R.V. Prescott and C. H. 
Schofield, Maritime Political Boundaries of the World (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 
2005), at 520–521. 
47  For reviews of these maritime delimitations see A. G. Oude Elferink, “Arctic Maritime 
Delimitations: Th e preponderance of similarities with other regions”, in Elferink and Rothwell 
(eds.), supra note 44, at 179–199; Prescott and Schofield, supra note 46, at 519–530. See also 
A. G. Oude Elferink, “Maritime delimitation between Denmark/Greenland and Norway”, 
Ocean Development and International Law (2007) 38: 375–380 for details of this agreement 
concluded in 2006. 
160 T. Potts, C. Schofield / Th e International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 23 (2008) 151–176
notably between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea48 and Canada and the 
USA in the Beaufort Sea,49 prospects for the delimitation of boundaries in the 
Arctic are enhanced by the lack of territorial disputes. Th e exception to this 
rule is Canada and Denmark’s sovereignty dispute over Hans Island, located 
in the Nares Strait between Ellesmere Island and Greenland. However, this 
dispute did not prevent the parties from concluding a continental shelf bound-
ary agreement in 1973, using an equidistance line as a basis for delimitation.50 
Th e innovative feature of this agreement is that not only was Hans island 
wholly discounted in the construction of the boundary line, but the line is 
actually discontinuous in order to accommodate the disputed island.51 
 Th e retreat of hitherto permanent ice in the Arctic has the potential to 
complicate matters, however, by revealing additional land territory that could, 
theoretically, be subject to competing sovereignty claims. In late October 2007 
it was reported that a small island dubbed “Stray Dog West” had been discov-
ered around 2.5 miles off the northern coast of Greenland.52 While there 
seems to be little doubt that this particular islet will be considered part of 
Greenland and thus under Danish sovereignty, it is perhaps not entirely incon-
ceivable that other features may be revealed in more contentious locations as 
ice cover melts, leading to further sovereignty disputes analogous to that over 
Hans Island. 
 If the Arctic is arguably generally unremarkable in terms of maritime claims 
and boundaries within 200 nm of the coast, the same cannot be said of claims 
48  Although Norway and Russia announced that they had signed a maritime boundary agree-
ment on 11 July 2007, the accord appears to clarify, update and reconfirm an agreement dat-
ing from 1957 and extends it into the southern Barents Sea. Th e two countries’ overlapping 
claims further north in the Barents Sea and their dispute over Norway’s maritime claims from 
Spitsbergen (Svalbard) remain unresolved. See “Agreement signed between Norway and Russia 
on maritime delimitation in the Varangerfj ord area”, Press Release, No.83/07, Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 July 2007. Available at <http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/
ud/Press-Contacts/News/2007/Agreement-signed-between-Norway-and-Russ.html?id=476347>; 
Elferink, supra note 47, at 181 and 185–190; Prescott and Schofield, supra note 46, at 524–
526; Elferink, supra note 47, at 190–194; 
49  H. Gray, “Canada’s unresolved maritime boundaries”, Boundary and Security Bulletin (1997) 
5 (3) (Autumn): 61–70, at 63–65; Prescott and Schofield, supra note 46, at 526. 
50  See J. I. Charney and L. M. Alexander (eds.) International Maritime Boundaries, Vol. I 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Th e Hague, 1993), at 371–385; Gray, supra note 49, at 69. 
51  Th e boundary stops just short of the island to the south of the island at Point 122 and then 
continues just to the north from Point 123. See ibid. and Prescott and Schofield, supra note 
46, at 265. 
52  Th e islet reportedly stands up to 12 feet (3.7 m) above sea level and is a 125–feet-long 
(38 m) depositional feature, meaning that it is vulnerable to erosion under moving pack-ice in 
winter. See “New land surfaces in Arctic tug-of-war”, Reuters, 31 October 2007. 
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beyond EEZ limits. As the Arctic is a semi-enclosed sea almost entirely sur-
rounded by the territories of littoral states, the maritime entitlements of the 
coastal states converge. Perhaps inevitably, there is therefore scope for multiple 
overlapping claims and disputes over extended continental shelf rights. Cer-
tainly there are a number of potential maritime boundaries beyond 200 nm 
from the coast in the central Arctic Ocean which have yet to be delimited.53  
 Determining Outer Continental Shelf Limits in the Arctic Ocean 
 On 2 August 2007 a Russian expedition used an unmanned submersible to 
drop a rust-proof titanium casket containing a Russian flag on the Arctic sea-
bed at around 4,200 m depth beneath the North Pole itself.54 Th is action 
generated considerable media coverage, much of which was decidedly alarmist 
in nature. Th is tone extended to the diplomatic arena when the Canadian 
Foreign Minister, Peter MacKay, appeared to dismiss the flag-dropping inci-
dent as a stunt, stating “Th is isn’t the 15th century. You can’t go around the 
world and just plant flags and say ‘We’re claiming this territory.’ ”55 
 Despite the bold rhetoric and febrile tenor of some the reaction, however, 
Russia’s exploits are in keeping with the action of the other Arctic coastal 
states. Th e Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, observed that “no one is 
throwing flags around” and analogies were drawn between Russia’s action and 
Hillary and Tenzing planting the Union Jack on the summit of Everest.56 Indeed, 
Lavrov was at pains to emphasise that Russia was not acting unilaterally; 
rather, its actions were “in strict compliance with international law.”57 Th is 
view was echoed by the Russian scientific establishment. For example, Victor 
Posyolov of the Russian Institute of Ocean Geology reportedly stated that: 
“A unilateral annexation of the area by Russia is impossible. We will strictly 
abide by the UN Convention.”58 Th is point is crucial. In fact, all of the Arctic 
states appear to be acting in accordance with international law. 
53  Elferink, supra note 47, at 195–197; Prescott and Schofield, supra note 46, at 523–529. 
54  It appears, somewhat bizarrely, that some of the Russian footage purporting to show this 
was “lifted” from the opening sequence of the Hollywood movie Titanic. See T. Parfitt, 
“Revealed: why those Russian submarine heroics might have looked a little familiar”, Th e 
Guardian, 11 August 2007. 
55  See “Canada dismisses Russia’s ‘15th-century stunt’ of claiming North Pole”, Th e Austra-
lian, 4 August 2007, T. Parfitt, “Russia’s Arctic Claim”, Th e Guardian, 10 August 2007. 
56  See “Russia guided by international law in its Polar Shelf probe”, RIA Novosti, 3 August 
2007. See also Townsend-Gault, supra note 41. 
57  Ibid. 
58  See Moore, supra note 40. 
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 Although subsequent Danish59 and US60 scientific expeditions were por-
trayed in the media as reactions to Russia’s Arctic moves, in reality these sur-
veying efforts were long planned. Such activities reflect the way in which all 
the Arctic coastal states are engaged in research designed to establish linkage 
between submarine areas beyond 200 nm from the coast and their respective 
continental margins in order to bolster their claims ahead of submissions to 
the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
(CLCS or the Commission). Indeed, these activities have in large part been 
prompted by looming deadlines for such submissions (see below). In contrast, 
the timing of Canada’s declaration, in the course of a three-day tour of the 
Arctic by the Prime Minister Stephen Harper, that it would be reinforcing 
its own Arctic claims, notably through the establishment of a cold-weather 
fighting training centre at Resolute Bay and a deep-water port at Nanisivik on 
Baffin Island, together with the recruitment of 900 troops to reinforce Cana-
da’s largely voluntary force of Rangers, in order to ‘monitor’ potential activity 
in the Arctic’s Northwest Passage and reinforce territorial claims, appear to be 
more of a reaction to the furore surrounding Russia’s claims.61 
 In fact, Russia was the first state in the world to submit a claim to the 
CLCS.62 Part of this 2001 claim relates to the Arctic Ocean beyond 200 nm 
from the coast. Th is claim, reportedly encompassing approximately 460,000 
square miles of seabed,63 provoked adverse comment from other Arctic claim-
ant states.64 Canada, Norway and Japan’s responses simply served to reserve 
their positions, especially with regard to undelimited maritime boundaries 
that each state shares with Russia.65 Th e USA, however, indicated that in its 
view the Russian submission contained serious flaws.66 Th e CLCS responded 
59 Perhaps ironically given the supposed ongoing competition amongst the Arctic littoral 
states, this expedition took place with the assistance of a chartered Russian nuclear-powered 
icebreaker. See, for example, “Danish team heads for North Pole”, BBC News, 13 August 
2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6941134.stm>; Leapman, supra note 1. 
60  Th e United States Coast Guard icebreaker USCGC Healy embarked on a month-long 
expedition to map parts of the Arctic Ocean sea floor in the vicinity of the northern Chukchi 
Cap on 17 August 2007. Th is research cruise followed similar efforts in 2003 and 2004. See 
“NOAA Coast Survey continues sea floor mapping expedition in the Arctic”, United States 
Coast Guard, Press Release, 13 August 2007, available at <www.uscg.mil/pacarea/healy/>. 
61  In terms of the timing of the announcement at least. See “Canada PM asserts Arctic claims”, 
BBC News, 10 August 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6939732.stm>. 
62  See <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_rus.htm>. 
63  Baev, supra note 18. 
64  See <www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_rus.htm>. 
65  Ibid. 
66  Ibid. 
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in 2002, indicating that Russia should make a revised submission.67 One of 
the objectives of the recent Russian expedition, and previous expeditions, was 
to gather information, notably concerning the linkage between the Mendeleev 
and Lomonosov Ridges to the Russian continental margin, to be included in 
Russia’s revised submission.68 
 Norway followed suit and made a submission to the CLCS in November 2006, 
which likewise elicited responses from interested states.69 Canada’s deadline 
for submission is in 2013 and in Denmark’s case it is 2014. As the USA is a 
non-Party to the LOSC, unsurprisingly no deadline for submission to the 
CLCS has been  set. 
 Th e question of extended continental shelf claims in accordance with Article 76 
of the LOSC is undoubtedly both legally and scientifically fraught and numer-
ous “complexities and ambiguities” associated with Article 76 have been identified,70 
as well as problems in respect of the way in which the Commission works.71 
 In the Arctic context, it appears that it may be possible for the coastal states 
to advance legitimate claims to most of the seabed of the Arctic Ocean.72 Two 
related analyses of potential extended shelf limits in the Arctic Ocean are par-
ticularly instructive on this issue.73 In 2000 it was suggested that the whole of 
67  Oceans and the Law of the Sea; Report of the Secretary-General; Addendum, Fifty-seventh 
session of the General Assembly, A/57/57/Add.1, paras. 27–41, at para. 41. See <http://
daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/629/28/PDF/N0262928.pdf?OpenElement>. 
68  R. Macnab, “Submarine ridges and elevations—wild cards in the poker game of Article 76”, 
presented at Symposium on Resources of the Seabed and Subsoil, 15–17 May 2006, Buenos 
Aires, Argentina, 17 pp, at 3–4, available at <http://www.caris.com/papers/macnab/WildCards.pdf>. 
69  See <www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_nor.htm>. 
70  R.Macnab, “Th e Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf in the Arctic Ocean”, in M. H. 
Nordquist, J. N. Moore and T. H. Heidar (eds.) Legal and Scientific Aspects of Continental Shelf 
Limits (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2004), pp. 301–311. Macnab has also provided 
a very useful analysis of “sources of ambiguity in the implementation of Article 76”. See 
R. Macnab, “Th e case for transparency in the delimitation of the outer continental shelf in accor-
dance with LOSC Article 76”, Ocean Development and International Law (2004) 35: 1–17, at 
2–9. Generally see also P. J. Cook and C. M.Carleton (eds.) Continental Shelf Limits: Th e 
Scientific and Legal Interface (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000). 
71  See, for example, T. McDorman, “Th e role of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf: A technical body in a political world”, International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 
(2002) 17 (3): 301–324. 
72  For an overview see, for example, A.G. Oude Elferink, “Th e Outer Continental Shelf in the 
Arctic: Th e application of Article 76 of the LOS Convention in a regional context”, in Elferink 
and Rothwell (eds.), supra note 44, at 139–156. 
73  Macnab et al., supra note 20; Macnab, supra note 70. Th ese studies relate to the central 
Arctic Ocean. Th e other areas beyond 200 nm from the coast, the so-called ‘Loop Hole’ in the 
Barents Sea and ‘Banana Hole’ in the Norwegian Sea (see map), are not considered here. 
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the seabed of the Arctic Ocean might well be subject to coastal state claims, 
with the exception of two ‘donut holes’ beyond national jurisdiction in the 
central Arctic Ocean.74 Th is study was revised in 2004 in light of the Com-
mission’s apparent response to Russia’s submission.75 In particular the Russian 
submission contended that the Mendeleev and Lomonosov Ridges were sub-
merged prolongations of the Russian landmass. It is understood, however, 
that the Commission remained unconvinced.76 
 While a certain amount of what might be termed educated guesswork was 
required, given the confidential nature of the Commission’s communications 
with Russia, this follow-up analysis indicated that two further potential ‘donut 
holes’ may exist, related to the aforementioned Alpha/Mendeleev and Lomonosov 
Ridges (see map).77 
 A critical issue in this context is the issue of distinguishing between “sub-
marine elevations” and “submarine ridges” and the application of cut-off lines 
to such features.78 Th is issue is complex, contentious and has generated con-
siderable debate.79 Th e language used in Article 76 on this issue has been 
termed “manifestly unhelpful”80 and has not been substantially clarified by 
the Commission’s Scientific and Technical Guidelines, which merely state: 
“the issue of ridges will be examined on a case-by-case basis.”81 While frustrat-
ing for coastal states faced with the task of formulating a submission, this 
illustrates the difficulties encountered by the drafters of the LOSC and the 
Commissioners themselves in developing rules applicable to all geographical, 
geological and geomorphological circumstances.82 
74  Macnab et al., supra note 20, at 92. 
75  Macnab, supra note 70. 
76  With regard to the Alpha-Mendeleev Complex, the Commission apparently cited “alterna-
tive hypotheses” regarding its nature and structure and expressed “reservations” concerning the 
linkage between the Lomonosov Ridge and the shelf of the Laptev and East Siberian Seas. See 
Macnab, supra note 70, at 303. Th e same author has subsequently noted that “informal indi-
cations” suggest that Russia’s arguments were questioned by the Commission “in part because 
of morphological breaks that were perceived to separate the ridges from the adjacent continen-
tal margin.” See Macnab, supra note 68, at 3–4. 
77  Macnab, supra note 70, at 304–305. 
78  LOSC, Article 76(5) and 76(6). 
79  See, for example, P. A. Symonds, M. F. Coffin, G. Taft and H. Kagami, “Ridge Issues” in 
Cook and Carleton (eds.), supra note 70, at 285–307; Macnab, supra note 70, at 303–304; 
R.Macnab, supra note 68. 
80  Macnab, supra note 68, at 1. 
81  Available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_documents.htm#Guidelines>. 
82  Macnab, supra note 68, at 2. 
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 Indeed, the time-consuming and expensive process of preparing a submis-
sion to the CLCS where ridges are involved has been likened to a high-stakes 
card game, though one where not only are the players unsure of the rules and 
thus of the value of their cards, but where the dealer (that is, the Commission) 
may ultimately rule a player’s hand to be essentially worthless: “At the end of 
the game, a coastal state may discover that not only did it misjudge the value 
of the cards that it was holding, but that it played them all wrong.”83 
 Th is unpleasant scenario is exacerbated by the confidentiality requirements 
surrounding the Commission’s recommendations and decision-making pro-
cess.84 Th is secrecy means that coastal states preparing submissions remain 
largely in the dark as to why, for example, a particular submission was accepted 
or rejected. It is therefore difficult for future claimant states to utilise the expe-
rience of those states that have gone before and benefit from previous state 
practice in analogous situations. Consequently, a submitting state may “make 
the same faulty assumptions concerning ridges and elevations that caused 
problems for other coastal states”, forcing a costly and time-consuming re-
evaluation and resubmission as a result.85 Unfortunately this situation may 
also result in “suspicion and scepticism” on the part of interested states denied 
access, on the basis of confidentiality, to the data used to justify a particular 
submission, and indeed the Commission’s rationale for accepting such a sub-
mission, potentially breeding “concerns about the impartiality and the integ-
rity of the process.”86 It has also been observed that at the current rate at which 
submissions are assessed—two per annum—the CLCS will be in existence for 
a considerable time to come, perhaps until 2035.87 
 In this context, the benefits of cooperative, or at least coordinated, approaches 
in the Arctic (and elsewhere) have been emphasised.88 Th is could allow for the 
development of common methodologies and, potentially, for data sharing. 
Contrasting analytical approaches and methodologies may well lead to 
different limits being constructed from the same data, illustrating that inter-
pretation can have a major role, for instance in the subjective choice of the 
location of the foot of the slope where several options are available. With 
regard to data, all the Arctic coastal states face problems associated with data 
83  Ibid., at 2–3 and 6. 
84  See, in particular, Macnab, supra note 70. 
85  Ibid. 
86  Ibid., at 12. 
87  Th e projection of 2035 assumes that the current rate at which the CLCS deals with submis-
sions (two per annum) is maintained and that there are 65 submissions in total. Th is indicates 
strongly that the CLCS faces serious challenges in dealing with anticipated submissions by the 
relevant deadlines (R. Macnab, personal communication, December 2007). 
88  Macnab, supra note 70, at 307–308. 
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collection in the Arctic (ironically this may be made significantly easier as a 
result of the removal of sea ice if this comes to pass as mentioned above).89 Th e 
pooling of data could lead, for example, to the construction of common mod-
els of bathymetry and sediment thickness.90 Where differing data sets are in 
use amongst claimants (which is certainly the case as a result of confidentiality 
in respect of data holdings), claimant states are also likely to calculate dis-
similar limits even when applying the same analytical techniques. 
 Cooperative or coordinated submissions to the CLCS are, however, ham-
pered by the fact that, as noted above, not all the coastal states are parties to 
the LOSC and that those that are became parties at different times, resulting 
in different deadlines for submission to the CLCS. Th is has led to a lack of 
synchronisation amongst the priorities and submission timetables of the inter-
ested states.91 
 Although suggesting cooperation may seem far-fetched in light of recent 
reports emphasising competing claims and disputes among the Arctic littoral 
states, the arguments in favour, in light of the issues and challenges outlined 
above, are compelling. In fact, despite discussion of cooperation apparently 
falling on deaf ears, at the formal political and diplomatic levels at least, and 
the culture of secrecy that seems to surround the preparation and consider-
ation of extended continental shelf submissions, there are some indications of 
progress. Cooperation at the informal and technical levels has been proceed-
ing for numerous years, for example resulting in the production of the Inter-
national Bathymetric Chart of the Arctic Ocean (IBCAO).92 Furthermore, 
the fact remains that multiple potential maritime boundaries beyond 200 nm 
from the coast exist in the central Arctic. Th e CLCS will not rule on these 
issues, as its findings are expressly without prejudice to delimitation.93 Nego-
tiations between the coastal states are therefore inevitable at some point if 
these boundaries are to be delimited. 
 Th e recent announcement on the part of the governments of Denmark and 
Greenland that they would host a “high-level” meeting on the Arctic in Illul-
isat, Greenland, in May 2008, perhaps represents a positive development in 
this regard. 
89  Macnab et al., supra note 20, at 88; Macnab, supra note 70, at 305–306. 
90  Ibid. 
91  Macnab et al., supra note 20, at 86. 
92  Macnab et al., supra note 20, at 88–90. 
93  LOSC, Article 76(10) and Annex II, Article 9. For a detailed analysis of the issues arising 
see A. G. Oude Elferink, “Submissions of coastal states to the CLCS in cases of unresolved and 
maritime disputes”, in Nordquist et al., supra note 70, at 263–285. 
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 Th reats to the Changing Arctic 
 Th is paper has highlighted that many threats to the Arctic environment and 
its peoples will occur from global and regional climatic shifts and associated 
increased human activity. While the duration, extent and mix of socio-economic 
activities are open to conjecture, it is likely that in the Arctic terrestrial and 
marine environment, economic activity will grow as regional warming pat-
terns evolve.94 
 Th e Arctic is home to a number of environmental threats, due to its prox-
imity to human populations and as a recipient of hazardous material. Pollut-
ants, such as radionuclides, heavy metals, and persistent organic pollutants, 
are in many cases generated elsewhere and transported by long-range atmo-
spheric mechanisms.95 Across the region, threats from pollutants exist from 
economic activities such as mining, heavy industry, tourism, shipping, mineral 
resource development and military activities.96 In addition, the harvesting and 
management of marine living resources such as Arctic Cod, a straddling and 
high seas stock between Norway and Russia, are a cause for concern.97 
 Th e dramatic increase of temperatures, as highlighted in the ACIA, 
and the melting of glacial and sea ice represent a ‘step change’ in the nature 
of impacts within and external to the Arctic. Th e rise in global average sea 
levels, partly driven by melting glacial ice in Greenland and the Antarctic, is 
an issue of considerable concern. As noted in the IPCC 4th Assessment 
Report, sea level could potentially rise by 0.6 m by 2099, threatening low-
lying areas and islands of countries such as Bangladesh, the Netherlands and 
the Maldives.98 
94  A conference paper by T. Valsson, “Th e North: Th e New European Frontier with Global 
Warming” (2005) AESOP Conference, Vienna; available at <http://aesop2005.scix.net/cgi-
bin/papers/Show?_id=558>, identifies a range of global demographic scenarios relating to 
global warming and the Arctic. 
95  O. S. Stokke “A legal regime for the Arctic? Interplay with the Law of the Sea Convention”. 
Marine Policy (July 2007) 31:402–408 at 404. Stokke stated that the Arctic serves as a reser-
voir for many hazardous substances, including radionuclides that have originated from Euro-
pean industrial plants, atmospheric nuclear tests from 40 to 50 years ago, and fallout from 
Chernobyl. 
96  Ibid., at 407. Stokke notes that states within the Arctic generate a significant amount of 
pollutants, including organochlorides, hydrocarbons, and heavy metals. Several major Russian 
industrial centers are located on rivers that directly feed into Arctic waters. 
97  See the Norwegian Government fisheries website, listing a summary of concerns about the 
sustainability of the North East Arctic Cod, available at <http://www.fisheries.no/marine_
stocks/fish_stocks/cod/north_east_arctic_cod.htm>. 
98  S. Solomon, D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K. B. Averyt, M. Tignor and 
H. L. Miller (eds.) “Summary for Policymakers”, in Climate Change 2007: Th e Physical Science 
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 Within the Arctic region itself, a warming environment will result in sig-
nificant impacts on natural and human systems. Th e ACIA identifies the 
region as very sensitive to climatic changes.99 Impacts on the environment 
include the shifting of vegetation zones and ecosystem-scale changes to Arctic 
habitats. Changes to species migration and breeding behaviour, foraging ecol-
ogy, and the introduction of invasive species will lead to altered diversity, 
distribution and abundance of species.100 In terms of coastal communities in 
the Arctic and the four million people living in the region, impacts from a 
warming climate include damage to infrastructure from melting permafrost 
and coastal erosion, and impacts on health, water supply and local econo-
mies.101 Indigenous cultures are closely linked with the Arctic environment 
and will be subject to impacts that will influence the loss of traditional culture 
and way of life in the Arctic.102 
 Th e retreat of summer sea ice presents an additional range of impacts and 
opportunities, depending on one’s perspective. It is plausible that sustainable 
economic development in the region could benefit regional communities and 
Arctic states, even if some of the opportunities identified above, notably in 
terms of seabed resource development and navigation, remain unrealised for 
the foreseeable future. However, unregulated, uncoordinated and inappropri-
ate activities, cumulative in nature in a sensitive environment, may present 
significant risks to the environmental quality of the Arctic. 
 With regard to navigation, for example, enhanced traffic involves increased 
risks of maritime accidents and the capacity of coastal states to deal with such 
an eventuality, both in terms of rescuing those involved and addressing the 
environmental impacts of, for example, a major oil spill. Recent accidents in 
both Polar Regions involving tourist operations serve to highlight the issue. In 
August 2007, the collapse of a glacier onto the Alexey Maryshev off Svalbard 
resulted in injuries to 46 tourists. In November 2007,103 the M/S Explorer 
Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change” (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and 
New York, USA, 2007), p. 13. Th e IPCC report notes that this conservative projection does 
not include the possibility of rapid changes in dynamical ice flow from the Greenland or the 
Antarctic ice sheets. 
 99  ACIA, supra note 7, at 991. 
100  See R. Rayfuse, supra note 5, at 203; ACIA, supra note 7, at 990–1003. 
101  ACIA, supra note 7, at 1000; R. Rayfuse supra note 5, at 202. 
102  Rayfuse, supra note 5, at 202. 
103  “Britons injured by Arctic glacier”, BBC News, 9 August 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/uk_news/6938940.stm>. 
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sank in the Antarctic, necessitating the emergency evacuation of 154 passen-
gers and crew.104 It is clear that such ‘expedition cruising’ in remote and poten-
tially hazardous waters is growing and it can be reasonably anticipated that 
this growth will continue.105 In December 2007, Norway experienced its sec-
ond largest oil spill, with 25,000 barrels of oil escaping into the North Sea 
from the Statfj ord oil field site, 124 miles west off the Norwegian coast. Th e 
incident has further raised concerns about anticipated future expansion of 
hydrocarbon extraction in the Barents Sea.106 It has also been suggested that 
increased maritime traffic will also lead to other undesirable impacts which 
will, in turn, pose significant security and enforcement challenges to Arctic 
states.107 Th e interpretation and application by states of the requirement in 
Article 234 of the LOSC to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory environ-
mental provisions in the face of increasing shipping will be a source of future 
legal debate.108 
 It is clear that in the Arctic mineral resources are of strategic importance 
and predominantly fall under the jurisdiction of Arctic states.109 However, as 
this paper has discussed, the extent of mineral resource reserves and  operational 
capacity is highly uncertain and certainly long term in nature. Any future devel-
opment must proceed with the mitigation of environmental impacts as its high-
est priority and as part of a shared vision from Arctic states. In addition to 
mineral resources, exploitation of living resources will emerge as another eco-
nomic opportunity with the retreat of summer sea ice. Th ere are significant 
gaps in the management of high seas stocks in the Arctic, particularly outside 
the jurisdiction of the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC)110 
and multilateral agreements, such as the trilateral Loophole agreement between 
Norway, Russia and Iceland.111 It is likely that new regional fisheries manage-
104  See S. Keenan, “Th e Growth of Arctic cruising”, Th e Times, 23 November 2007; “Stricken 
Antarctic ship evacuated”, BBC News, 24 November 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
americas/7108835.stm>; “Chile completes shipwreck airlift”, BBC News, 25 November 2007, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7112239.stm>. 
105  Keenan, ibid. 
106  “Norway Oil Spill Contained, Stirs Fears for Arctic”, Planet Ark, 14 December 2007, 
<http://www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/46027/story.htm>. 
107  Writing about the possible opening up of the Northwest Passage, Byers and Lalonde (supra 
note 30, at 30) note that such a shipping route could “provide an avenue for the entry into 
North America of drugs, guns, illegal immigrants and perhaps even terrorists.” 
108  I. V. Stepanov, “Legal Implications for the Russian Northern Sea Route and Westward in the 
Barents Sea” (Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Norway, 2005), 120 pp. 
109  Stokke, supra note 95, at 405. 
110  Rayfuse, supra note 5, at 212. 
111  For a history of the development of fisheries and straddling stock issues in the Barents Sea, 
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ment agreements may have to be considered for the Arctic high seas in order 
to safeguard stocks. Th e movement of stocks due to changing environmental 
conditions and the increase of maritime activity will cause further pressures 
on managing existing Arctic fisheries. Th is includes coastal, port and market 
state responses to incidences of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) 
fishing and the governance of high seas stocks under changing physical condi-
tions, against the backdrop of undelimited international boundaries and thus 
overlapping maritime claims. An example is the ongoing issue of sustainable 
management of productive Barents Sea fisheries including Arctic cod, herring, 
haddock and capelin. Th is region has been heavily fished since the 1950s and 
is a key supply of seafood for Europe. Issues of overfishing and IUU pressures 
on stocks combined with the uncertainties from climate impacts raise complex 
issues for future management.112  
 Oceans Governance Challenges 
 Governance in the Arctic occurs through a mix of domestic and international 
legal instruments and “soft law” regional agreements. Th e foundation for 
regional action has been the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy 1991, 
which was superseded by the Arctic Council in 1996.113 Th e Arctic Council is 
a ‘high level forum to provide a means for prompting cooperation, coordina-
tion and interaction among the Arctic states with the involvement of the 
Arctic indigenous communities . . . on common Arctic issues’.114 Th e Arctic 
refer to: European Environment Agency, “Arctic Environment: European Perspectives. Why 
should Europe care?” (2004) European Environment Agency, Copenhagen, 59 pp, at 19. 
112  Th e Directorate of Fisheries in Norway regularly reports on the over-harvesting of Barents 
Sea cod by Russian vessels. Its 2006 report suggests Russia harvested approximately 315,000 
tonnes of cod and 87,000 tonnes of haddock. Th is catch exceeded the 2005 quota by 101,000 
tonnes for cod and 36,000 tonnes for haddock. In 2006, calculations show that Russian fishing 
exceeded the quota by approximately 117,000 tonnes for cod and 28,000 tonnes for haddock. 
Refer to: Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries, “Report: Status Report for 2005—Russian 
Cod and Haddock Fishing / transshipment at sea” (March 2006), p. 12; Norwegian Director-
ate of Fisheries, “Russian fishing of cod and haddock 2006” (March 2007), 8 pp. Available 
at: <http://www.fiskeridir.no/fiskeridir/content/download/10057/84126/>. For discussion on 
approaches to fisheries management in the Arctic under changing physical and jurisdictional 
regimes refer to Rayfuse, supra note 5, at 213 and Stokke, supra note 95, at 403. 
113  L. Nowlan, “Arctic Regime for Environmental Protection” (IUCN, Gland, Switzerland and 
ICEL, Bonn, Germany, 2001). 
114  Declaration of the Establishment of the Arctic Council, Ottawa (1996), available at 
<http://arctic-council.org/filearchive/Declaration%20on%20the%20Establishment%20of%
20the%20Arctic%20Council.pdf>. 
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Council is not an international organisation with legal personality,115 but an 
international forum between Arctic states and permanent participants that 
represent indigenous nations of the Arctic. Its mandate is to build cooperation 
and interaction across six working groups.116 In addition to the Arctic Coun-
cil, several regional organisations have emerged over the past decade to address 
a variety of governance issues such as indigenous capacity building, European 
and Russian cooperation, and sustainable development.117 
 Over recent years questions have been raised by commentators over whether 
the existing regime is sufficient to protect and manage the Arctic or whether a 
new regime is required in the face of considerable environmental change and 
increasing socio-economic activity.118 Despite the presence and continuity of 
this debate, the dominant paradigm in the Arctic is one of state sovereignty 
(or, frequently, sovereign rights in the maritime sphere) and cooperation 
via regional instruments.119 In the medium term, it is likely that future socio-
economic pressure driven by Arctic environmental changes will operate within 
this existing legal framework. 
 Although domestic laws control development and environmental manage-
ment in areas under national jurisdiction, these laws are influenced by inter-
national commitments, particularly in areas relating to the marine environment. 
International regimes concerning climate change, biodiversity, fisheries, trade 
and environmental protection are enacted by some or all of the Arctic states, 
but their application remains patchy, and many of the problems, such as cli-
mate change, require solutions stretching far beyond the Arctic. As Arctic 
states have opted to pursue a “soft law” voluntary regime focusing on the 
coordination of scientific research, environmental management and sustain-
able development, efforts to protect and manage the Arctic can suffer from a 
‘lowest common denominator’ effect, where a lack of action by one or more 
states can undermine or hinder the effective action of others. In addition, this 
approach builds in a lack of multilateral binding enforceable targets and avoids 
115  See Nowlan, supra note 113, at 5. 
116  Working groups include Sustainable Development Program (SDWG), Arctic Monitoring 
and Assessment Program (AMAP), Emergency, Prevention, Preparedness and Response Pro-
gram (EPPRP), Protection of Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), Conservation of Arctic 
Flora and Fauna (CAFF), and Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP). Refer to Arctic 
Council Homepage (2007), available at < http://arctic-council.org/working_group/acap>. 
117  See Nowlan, supra note 113, at 6. 
118  See Stokke, supra note 95, at 407; in addition, the Arctic Frontiers conference in Tromso, 
Norway, 2007, debated the issues surrounding a potential treaty. See: <http://www.eea.europa.
eu/pressroom/speeches/23–01–2007>. 
119  Rayfuse, supra note 5, at 198. 
 T. Potts, C. Schofield / Th e International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 23 (2008) 151–176 173
a level playing field for environmental protection and management activities. 
On the other hand, the current regionalist approach characterised by the Arctic 
Council has been identified by commentators as moderately successful and 
realistic but potentially due for reform120 as greater international attention is 
focused on the Arctic. 
 With the significant present and future changes occurring in the Arctic 
environment from climatic change and with the corresponding increase in 
geopolitical and commercial activity, the Arctic faces a complex and challeng-
ing future. Th is paper identifies three scenarios for future governance arrange-
ments—that of an existing or ‘status quo’ regime, a mixed reform regime, and 
a binding international regime. 
 Th e continuance of the existing and moderately successful soft law regime 
in the Arctic is a highly likely scenario, particularly in the context that Arctic 
coastal states are unlikely to relinquish their sovereignty to a larger binding 
international regime.121 In addition, the divergence of political opinion over 
the future use of the Arctic, together with continued geopolitical position-
ing,122 render it difficult for establishment of a binding agreement and leads to 
the notion of progressing within existing boundaries. As noted by Stokke, a 
‘flexible approach to norm building’123 within existing frameworks would 
appear to be a likely way to move forward on difficult issues and continue 
to improve regional environmental governance on issues such as monitoring 
and impact assessment, coordinating and harmonising regulations, promot-
ing cleaner production and reducing pollution. In addition, sovereign states, 
bound by domestic legislation and increasing international commitments, 
have primary responsibility for performance on environmental standards 
and implementation of responsibilities under international regimes such as 
the LOSC. Th is scenario continues to promote Arctic issues on the world 
stage whilst at the same time preserving the geopolitical status quo and avoid-
ing the governance complexities from an increasingly active and changing 
Arctic. 
 A mixed reform regime would seek to reform the existing governance 
approach identified above. It would actively seek to address the inefficiencies 
120  Rayfuse, supra note 5, at 216, notes that Arctic states may be better served by greater coop-
eration and harmonization under the current regime. Stokke, supra note 95, at 407, highlights 
that environmental governance has been strengthened under the existing regime. 
121  See Rayfuse, supra note 5, at 21; Stokke, supra note 95, at 407. 
122  Baev, supra note 18, at 8, highlights recent security actions that may constitute the reemer-
gence of a deterrence system strategy by Russia and the Arctic as a part of a reformed geopo-
litical agenda. 
123  See Stokke, supra note 95, at 408. 
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and gaps of the existing ‘unambitious regime’124 and move toward proactively 
addressing Arctic issues where clear reform is needed. Th is could be a likely 
scenario where Arctic coastal states and other states with interests in the region 
move ahead on an issue-by-issue basis under international frameworks such as 
the LOSC, particularly in the context of Article 122 on regional cooperation 
in (semi-)enclosed seas.125 Th is approach would retain the principle of sover-
eign control in the Arctic but increase cooperation and move forward on the 
difficult and emerging multilateral issues. Commentators have noted that there 
is a legal, and arguably moral, imperative for Arctic states to cooperate on trans-
boundary issues of common concern, particularly under the banner of scientific 
research as operates under the Antarctic Treaty.126 For example, there is a clear 
gap in the current regime for straddling stocks and high seas fisheries manage-
ment in the Arctic.127 With climate-induced changes in the distribution and 
abundance of fisheries,128 new pressures will emerge on the management of 
stocks. Th e LOSC, through the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement, strongly 
encourages the development of regimes to conserve and manage fish stocks 
that straddle national boundaries and the high seas. A regional treaty on high 
seas, migratory and straddling Arctic stocks could replace the existing compli-
cated bilateral, trilateral and multilateral agreements currently in place and 
take a precautionary approach to management of fisheries not under national 
jurisdiction and under changing biophysical conditions. In addition, reform 
could be made to the protection of Arctic biodiversity129 through strengthen-
ing existing domestic action under international agreements, such as the Con-
vention on Biological Diversity, and promoted through the Arctic Council; 
strengthening existing international regimes such as the Convention for 
124  See Nowlan, supra note 113, at 8. 
125  Refer to note 5, supra. 
126  R. Macnab, “Coastal state sovereignty in the Arctic offshore: Is it compatible with the 
concept of a borderless north?”, Proceedings of the fourth Northern Research Forum, Th e 
Borderless North, Oulu and Tornio in Finland, and Haparnada and Luleå in Sweden
5–8 October, 2006, available at http://www.nrf.is/Publications/Th e%20Borderless%20North/
Second%20Th eme_Macnab.pdf and R. Macnab, O. Loken and A. Anand, “Th e Law of the 
Sea and Marine Scientific Research in the Arctic Ocean”, Canadian Polar Commission, Meridian, 
(Fall/Winter 2007), at 1–6, <http://www.polarcom.gc.ca/media.php?mid=3278>. 
127  See Rayfuse, supra note 5, at 212; and Baev, supra note 18, at 12. 
128  J. McGoodwin, “Effects of climatic variability on three fishing economies in high latitude 
regions: Implications for fisheries polices.” Marine Policy (2007) 17: 40–55. 
129  MPA News “Experts discuss proactive protection of the Arctic Ocean in anticipation of 
climate change”, MPA News, August 2007: School of Marine Affairs, U. of Washington, avail-
able at <http://depts.washington.edu/mpanews/MPA88.pdf>; Rayfuse, supra note 5, at 213; 
Nowlan, supra note 113, at 56. 
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the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (the 
“OSPAR Convention”) or fishery regimes such as the NEAFC; or through 
development of a new international regime to cover high seas issues. Com-
mentators have suggested that negotiations under the LOSC for management 
of areas beyond national jurisdiction may provide a catalyst for nations to 
agree that cooperation and sustainable development is an appropriate out-
come in the face of regional claims and tensions.130 
 Th e final scenario of a new comprehensive binding international regime, 
i.e., an ‘Arctic Treaty’, is an unlikely outcome. Clear reform is needed within 
the existing Arctic system, particularly in relation to a clear vision with estab-
lished targets and the ability to address emerging transboundary problems. 
However, it is yet to be demonstrated that Arctic states have the political will 
or desire to move in this direction, with effort focused on moderately success-
ful voluntary approaches. Several ideas have been discussed in consideration 
of a binding pan-Arctic treaty mechanism loosely based on the ‘Antarctic’ 
model.131 
 Th ere is a continuing expansion of international agreements and treaties 
concerning the regulation of the environment and maritime affairs globally as 
well as across Arctic states. Th e many regional, bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments on pollution, resource exploitation, maritime and security issues lead to 
a highly complex regulatory environment in the Arctic. Arctic states are clearly 
reluctant to yield domestic power to an international authority in the Arctic. 
However, a binding treaty does merit further ongoing debate, especially as a 
means to harmonise the various environmental commitments embedded in 
international treaties and enacted via states. Th e emerging negotiations on 
determining the extended continental shelf, the mooted action of the US in 
ratifying the LOSC, and the ongoing changes in the Arctic environment may 
potentially provide the backdrop for a discussion based on the common good 
rather than national self-interest. 
 Overall, the future of governance in the Arctic is filled with uncertainty and 
change. Change is coming from many directions, from the underlying physi-
cal and biological ecosystem driven by climatic warming, from geopolitical 
stances from the Arctic states, and in a resurgent interest in the potential or 
actual living and non-living resources of the region. While many forecasts of 
driving forces contain elements of uncertainty, best international practice 
would develop and apply a precautionary and multilateral approach to the 
130  Baev, supra note 18, at 3. 
131  See Nowlan, supra note 113, at 58. 
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issues, backed by scientific research, an Arctic vision, and the political will to 
act on identified key issues of concern, such as resource sustainability and 
maritime jurisdictional claims. Whether these approaches evolve via a con-
tinuation of the status quo, a limited reform approach, or a new international 
regime is yet to be determined, but it is hoped that the future of the Arctic is 
one of sustainable development, peace and international cooperation. 
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